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CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR BY
ELITE DECISION-MAKERS
SYMPOSIUM
Perspectives from Law and Social
Psychology
Introduction-
James A. Fanto'
Here it is, almost three years after the fall of Enron, and
the trials of some of the top executives involved in the
corporate scandals are still proceeding or yet to begin. All too
often the same pattern emerges. Significant senior executives,
like a company's chief financial officer (CFO) and underlings,
plead guilty to the misdeeds that brought down a firm and then
act as government witnesses against the chief executive officer
(CEO). The CEO resists vigorously, with the best defense
counsel that money can buy, alleging that the scandal was
solely the work of the CFO and his unscrupulous cohorts. In
each scandal, the debate in the courtroom and the business
press is about who is the individual ultimately responsible for
the scandal. Generally, if a group is singled out in the
discussion at all, it is the corporation's board of directors. But
the board is not regarded as central to the scandal, except in a
© 2005 James A. Fanto. All Rights Reserved.
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kind of negative manner, as being too inactive and indifferent
in its oversight to have detected the misbehavior.
Examples abound. The drama of the responsibility for
WorldCom's demise has just played out in court in a trial
pitting its former CEO Bernie Ebbers (who was found guilty on
numerous charges) against its former CFO Scott Sullivan (who
has already pleaded guilty to securities fraud) as the prime
mover in the fraud.' In another courtroom, former HealthSouth
CEO Richard Scrushy is defending himself against fraud
charges, with the chief opposing witnesses being the former
CFOs (who all have pleaded guilty to securities fraud).2
Kenneth Lay, former Chairman and CEO, and Jeffrey Skilling,
former CEO, of Enron, have yet to come to trial.3 Arrayed
against them will be the notorious Andrew Fastow, former
CFO, and a host of lesser executives, who have all entered into
plea agreements with the government. For the most part, board
members of these companies (other than inside board
members) have not been criminally charged, but are the subject
of civil suits on account of their inattention that allowed the
scandals to go on for so long.'
It is no surprise that the criminal trials are proceeding
in this way, given that our criminal law and justice system are
designed to determine an individual's guilt. Nor is it a surprise
that the business media, which is in many cases really only a
step up from the tabloids, strives to gain and maintain readers
by emphasizing the personal stories behind the corporate
scandals. Both of these reactions to the scandals reveal a
fundamental human tendency to attribute complex misdeeds to
individuals.5 This is the "bad apples" understanding of the
corporate scandals or problems. This attribution error applies
to complex positive outcomes as well.' For example, the
One can follow this saga in the pages of the Wall Street Journal. See, e.g.,
Almar Latour, et al., Ebbers is Convicted in Massive Fraud, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2005,
at Al.
2 See, e.g., Dan Morse & Evelina Shmukler, HealthSouth Ex-Treasurer Says
He Found Fraud, Told Scrushy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at C4.
' See Start of Enron Trial Is Set for January '06, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2005,
at C2.
4 See, e.g., Settlement Motion, In re Enron Corp., et al. (No. 01-16034 (AJG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2005)) (discussing settlement with outside directors of
Enron).
This erroneous reasoning seems to be based on a general human tendency
to simplify causation. See generally ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 169-94 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing this human cognitive mistake).
6 See generally NASSIM N. TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS (2001)
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business media is only too ready to lionize corporate executives
for the achievement of their firms: one has only to go back to
the late 1990s to find article after article extolling Kenneth Lay
and Bernie Ebbers. This is not to say that individuals matter
for nothing in scandals or in success. But to focus on
individuals blinds us to the complex causes of misbehavior (to
consider the focus of this conference) and keeps us from making
reforms that could prevent the recurrence of this misbehavior.
The principal purpose of the conference, "Corporate
Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers: Perspectives from Law
and Social Psychology," is to offer an alternative to the
understanding that corporate misconduct and scandals are due
to the work of a few "bad apples" among corporate executives
and directors. From information available on the scandals, it
appeared that inner circles of top executives, corporate advisors
(accountants, bankers and lawyers) and board members formed
coherent social structures that engaged in illegal or unethical
behavior that destroyed firm value.' A possible determinant of
the scandals, in other words, was group, not individual,
behavior. If this was the case, a number of interesting
questions are posed and research avenues opened that could
have important consequences for legal policy-making. What is
perverse group behavior and what distinguishes it from
positive group behavior? How did this group misbehavior arise
in so many publicly-traded firms, which suggests that
corporate governance structure contributed to it? How could
individual members of these circles or groups engage in
behavior that, on some levels, they knew was improper, but
nevertheless accepted from a group perspective?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to turn to the
social sciences, for one of the goals of social psychology and
organizational theory is to understand and explain group
behavior, including deviant group behavior. My co-organizer,
Professor Larry Solan,' and I thought that it would be useful to
ask what researchers in these human sciences could tell legal
scholars about the social psychological and other organizational
causes of the corporate elite's misbehavior. We decided that the
(discussing tendency of individuals to take credit for random positive outcomes).
7 I develop this argument in greater detail in my article, Whistleblowing and
the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OREGON L. REV. 435 (2004).
8 Director of Brooklyn Law School's Center for the Study of Law, Language
and Cognition, which sponsored the conference together with the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation.
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best way to achieve this purpose was to bring together at a
conference prominent social psychologists and organizational
and management specialists to present and to discuss their
theories and research about group misbehavior that could help
explain the corporate scandals. We planned to have corporate
law scholars, as discussants, comment upon the implications of
these findings and research for policy making on the legal
regulation of corporate governance and decision-making.
One goal of the conference was pragmatic: to find
solutions to the misconduct of elite corporate decision makers
from a social science perspective that legal policy makers,
fixated on individuals as primary causes of the scandals, had
overlooked. Yet the dialogue of conference participants was not
addressed directly to policy makers as such, and it would have
that pragmatic effect indirectly by contributing to a new
direction in corporate legal scholarship. A complementary goal
was then to stimulate and promote interactions and research
between social psychologists and organizational theorists, on
the one hand, and corporate scholars, on the other.
These interactions and possible joint research would
help correct a tendency in the dominant direction of current
corporate law scholarship to ignore group causes of corporate
governance problems, which tendency has led to reforms that
can only incompletely prevent corporate misbehavior. So much
of this scholarship is grounded in the law and economics
tradition that bases its policy prescriptions upon rational, self-
interested economic actors.' When faced with the corporate
scandals, scholars in this tradition react in ways not unlike
business reporters, members of Congress or federal
prosecutors: they focus on the individual. For example, if a
CEO, like Dennis Kozlowski, took too many benefits from his
former company, Tyco International, it was because
appropriately designed incentives had not been in place for all
the corporate actors involved: his compensation package was
not correctly keyed to his performance, and the members of the
Tyco's board did not have adequate personal incentives to
check his natural self-interested behavior. From this
9 There have been notable exceptions. We were fortunate to have at our
conference as discussants, Donald Langevoort and Lynne Dallas, two legal scholars
who have for some time used social science methods and research in their analysis of
corporate and securities law issues and problems.
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perspective, corporate scandals can be addressed only by
reforms aimed at these individuals."
Our focus in this conference, as would be our focus in
the resulting research, is different. For us, individual behavior
within groups can be understood as determined by group
dynamics. This means more than that an individual is
conscious of and affected by others, although this is certainly a
part of the analysis. It is, rather, an account of how individuals
as group members assume a social or group identity, which in
turn influences their behavior when they are in the group. The
influence comes when the group identity defines, among other
things, the roles and appropriate behavior for individuals
within the group. The study of group dynamics examines the
formation of this group identity and the way in which it shapes
thought, perception and behavior. The study should explain
how groups with perverse purposes can form and how
individuals participate in them and come to find their actions
within the group entirely natural and proper, even though
when viewed from a perspective outside the group, the
individuals acknowledge them to be completely improper.
To encourage discussion as to the group nature of the
misbehavior in the corporate scandals, we asked conference
participants to consider the following related questions in
making their presentations and preparing their articles:
1. Do corporate scandals reveal problems of group
misbehavior among corporate elite decision-makers and
advisors? Can social psychology and organizational theory help
us identify the nature and causes of the problems?
2. Are there differences between the ways that people
perceive themselves as individuals on the one hand and as
members of groups on the other that can explain, at least in
part, corporate misconduct?
3. Can corporate reformers do anything about these
problems? Can social psychology and related human sciences
offer reformers any guidance? In this connection, significant
reforms aimed at elite corporate decision-makers and advisors
have already occurred. From a social psychological perspective,
how well-designed are they to address the group problems and
how effective are they likely to be?
'0 See, e.g., Michael Jensen, et al., Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We
Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them (ECGI, Working Paper No.
44/2004, July 2004).
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We think that each of the articles in this volume
answers one or several of the above questions and together the
articles represent the work that we wanted to foster and to
share with a wide scholarly audience.
In his article, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of
Contagious Organizational Corruption, Professor of Psychology
John Darley appropriately begins the volume with a focus on
the first group of questions by taking issue with the "bad
apples" theory of corporate corruption, which, in his view,
allows people to ignore the complex causes of corruption in
corporations and other organizations. These causes include the
phenomenon that Professor Darley has identified in his
previous work: that corruption begins gradually, often with a
small act that is morally ambiguous or barely improper, and
proceeds by small steps until the corruption is monumental.
This gradual descent into the immoral helps explain why so
many ordinary individuals can participate in corruption. In a
related point, Professor Darley observes that the acts leading to
corporate corruption are the product not of moral deliberation
but of quick, intuitive judgments, and these judgments are
inherently self-interested (either for the individual, the group
or both). He then discusses how these corrupt, self-interested
acts spread or are imitated in an organization. This
propagation occurs because those who are disturbed by the acts
feel pressured to remain silent since the organization sends the
message that the acts are acceptable. Even more significantly
for the purposes of the conference, Professor Darley points out
that group loyalty prevents employees from complaining about
the progressively corrupt practices. The foundations of this
loyalty, as discussed in more detail by Professor Hogg in his
article, lie in an individual's self-identification with the group,
which transforms him or her into a group member with the
group's values.
The article, Out of Touch: The CEO's Role in Corporate
Misbehavior, by Professor of Organizational Behavior Linda
Trevifio, appropriately follows Professor Darley's, because she
argues that a CEO of a firm is critical for the development of
its ethical culture, which can help prevent scandals and
abuses. For her, the importance of the CEO appears first in the
design and implementation of a firm ethics program: is it
window dressing, or is the program formal, value-oriented and
integrated into the life of the firm? These latter attributes
make the ethics program effective, i.e., make employees more
likely to behave ethically and report ethical violations because
1170 [Vol. 70:4
2005] CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR BY ELITE DECISION-MAKERS 1171
they feel that ethics matters to the firm and the firm will
support them and will punish ethical violators. She observes
that the CEO must also foster an ethical culture informally, for
the CEO's everyday behavior (which employees observe)
reinforces the firm's formal systems. The CEO does this by
providing a visible example of a moral individual (one who
personally cares about ethics) and a moral manager (one who
shows in his or her management that ethics matters). Professor
Trevifto further argues that leaders must make their ethical
decisions visible, provided that they are otherwise ethical
persons and not hypocrites, because, unfortunately, there is a
large social distance between the CEO and most employees.
Professor Trevifio then uses this distance also to explain why
many CEOs fail to understand the ethical problems in their
organization. Situated at the top of the firm, insulated from
much of its activities and yet personally identified with it, a
CEO cannot see many of its ethical problems and tends to
adopt a rosy view of the organization. She also points out that
because CEOs socialize almost exclusively with others of
similar status they are unaware of issues and problems at the
ordinary employee level.
Then, in his comment on Professor Darley's and
Professor Trevifio's articles, entitled Discussing Corporate
Misbehavior, Professor of Law Daniel Greenwood points to the
disturbing outcome in U.S. corporate law: the narrowing of the
purposes of the large complex organization, that is the public
corporation, to a maximization of shareholder wealth. He
insightfully observes that, while enormous CEO pay has been
justified by the need to motivate self-interested individuals to
perform well, CEOs state that they have little connection to
and awareness of the enterprise whenever they are accused of
being responsible for a scandal. The outsized CEO
compensation, he contends, thus has no justification in light of
the CEO's great distance from other employees, especially
since, as Professor Treviflo shows, the CEO's example and
connection with the firm are critical to the development of its
ethical culture. Commenting on Professor Darley's article,
Professor Greenwood emphasizes how it underscores the
weakness of a corporate law that ignores the organizational
complexity of firms. For Professor Greenwood, employees'
pursuit of organizational goals and purposes, which, according
to Darley, lead them into scandals, points to a contradiction
lying at the heart of firms: the good for which individuals are
asked to sacrifice their time and even their liberty is only the
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self-interest of the firm, which is an impoverished parody of
morality and of the value of the common good and which,
paradoxically, ends up driving the firm out of business.
Professor Greenwood concludes his comment by setting forth
broad ideas for reforms that might reintroduce values into
corporate law debates.
Professor of Social Psychology Michael Hogg squarely
addresses, in his article, Social Identity and Misuse of Power:
The Dark Side of Leadership, the second conference question
(Are there differences in social and individual self-
conceptions?) by using social identity theory (of which he is a
major exponent) to explain group features that could have led
to the corporate scandals. Professor Hogg initially sets forth
the basics of social identity theory, which explains how
individuals categorize others and themselves in terms of their
identity in significant groups (such as work groups), i.e., they
"depersonalize" themselves and others in their group
membership. He then describes how leadership makes sense in
this theory: a leader is a prototypical member of a group, yet
also with the ability to experiment in his or her behavior so as
to lead the group in new directions (a member with
"charisma"). But this account points to potential group
problems. As Professor Hogg explains, if group norms defining
group and individual member behavior do not include ethics,
then group members, especially leaders, are likely to act
unethically as part of the group. Moreover, given the deference
of group members, the leader can move the group gradually
towards unethical behavior. Indeed, as he explains, the leader
can even use his or her status to begin to isolate himself or
herself and a small coterie from the rest of the group (as
demonstrated by CEOs in many scandal-ridden firms).
Professor Hogg then introduces another important aspect of
social identity theory, a group's reduction of uncertainty, to
explain unethical corporate behavior. He outlines a situation
that can lead to scandals: individuals in corporations form
groups with strong social identity and with powerful leaders
because of the uncertainty of competitive corporate life. The
leader and his or her minions may, in turn, become isolated in
the organization and, if unchecked, they may lead it into
corruption and disaster.
In their co-written piece, Professor of Organizational
Behavior Rakesh Khurana and graduate student Katharina
Pick pose the individual vs. the group problem in contending
that a board of directors cannot be understood only as a
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collection of individuals. They first survey the understanding of
the board under the dominant agency theory as a collection of
individuals contracting with the firm and argue that the
agency perspective does not capture the experience of board
members or the facts about the corporate scandals. (But they
warn that agency theory may create boardroom reality by
encouraging board members to think of themselves as only self-
interested individuals.) In an approach similar to those of
Professor Darley and Hogg, they then discuss the social
attributes of boards that make them similar to other groups
and that may have led to the scandals. Boards act cohesively
pursuant to well understood group norms, but, as Khurana and
Pick explain, these norms can prevent directors from
questioning critically CEOs and other senior executives, which
would have revealed problems in firms. They also point out
that board norms are long lasting and difficult to change, and
that these norms reinforce board members' conformity to the
group's perspective and generally discourage dissent of any
kind. The passivity is understandable in situations of
uncertainty, which is usually that of a board, where experts,
such as senior executives, offer authoritative views and where
non-expert board members are discouraged from ever becoming
active in raising issues. Khurana and Pick make the
interesting additional observation that board norms of one firm
are often similar to the norms of other firms, since board
members constitute a small, closed population in U.S. society.
Moreover, the authors observe that, like all groups, boards
have developed routines for dealing with their tasks, which
routines, occasionally, enable them to overlook critical issues
and information (such as the Enron board's routine approval of
conflict of interest transactions). Khurana and Pick conclude
their article, however, with an optimistic observation about the
social nature of boards: increasingly norms of professionalism
for board members are being developed, which may improve
overall board performance and board norms.
In a response to the third set of questions about the
contribution of the social sciences to corporate reform,
Professor of Psychology Tom Tyler poses the question how
businesses with well-meaning executives can achieve employee
compliance with laws and ethical norms. At the beginning of
his article, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule
Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-regulatory
Approaches, he contrasts two methods of firm ethical
governance: the "command and control" model, which relies on
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external sanctions and rewards, with the "self-regulatory"
model, which relies on internal employee motivations.
Professor Tyler points out that businesses have traditionally
used the "command and control" model, which ensures
compliance with policies through incentives and sanctions but
which is costly and not particularly effective. The self-
regulatory model, on the other hand, ensures compliance by
activating in work settings employees' own ethical values,
which in turn legitimates the organization's values and rules.
Professor Tyler discusses the empirical support for the self-
regulatory model, which also demonstrates its utility and
effectiveness in business settings. He next explains that a firm
can best activate employees' ethical values by having
employees perceive that fair procedures are used in firm
decision-making and other workplace events. His message here
is that employees feel comfortable about working for an
organization and find its rules to be legitimate if they perceive
that it treats them fairly. This finding gives companies a clear
guideline: if they want employees to comply with a company's
rules and otherwise to act ethically, the company must
establish fair procedures for workplace decisions. This raises
the question of what constitutes a fair procedure, and Professor
Tyler offers definitions and examples involving four important
procedural components: the quality of decision-making, the
quality of peoples' treatment by organizational authorities, the
rules of the organization and an employee's experience with a
supervisor(s).
In his article, Structural Holes, CEOs, and
Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate
Governance, Professor of Law Lawrence Mitchell argues that
the reform focus of improving the independence and monitoring
ability of corporate boards misses an important origin of the
corporate scandals in the power of CEOs and other senior
executives. To explain this power, Professor Mitchell uses the
theory of "structural holes" from economic sociology, which
posits gaps between networks of individuals and groups and
the importance and advantages that accrue to people who can
fill the gaps. Unlike classical economics, the theory sees the
actor as a social creature, i.e., a part of various social networks.
After discussing the theory and situating it in economic and
sociological discourse, he uses it to point to the gaps in the
governance of public corporations that corporate actors can use
opportunistically and that reforms should (but don't) address.
For Professor Mitchell, the theory suggests that the current
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effort to control CEO power by emphasizing boards with
independent directors may have the opposite result, for in
firms with these boards the CEO alone would fill the structural
holes of information about the corporation for the directors (as
opposed to the situation of a board with inside directors who
would be part of other informational networks in the
corporation). Even more interestingly, Professor Mitchell uses
the theory to explain scandals involving senior executives,
other than the CEO, because the CEO, consciously or not, may
allow structural holes to develop beneath him in the
organization, which are filled by senior executives who could
engage in unscrupulous behavior (if so inclined) and which give
the CEO "deniability." Professor Mitchell further justifies his
application of the theory by pointing to the movement in
business organization from hierarchical to flatter
organizational structures. The latter allow for more structural
holes, because more managers report to the CEO, and thus
more possibilities of CEO or senior executive opportunism
(depending upon who fills the holes). He thus argues that
typical reforms aimed exclusively at enhancing the board's
monitoring ability miss structural holes below the board as an
important determinant of the corporate scandals.
Although she was not a presenter at the conference,
Professor of Philosophy Margaret Gilbert offers her views on
the subject of corporate misbehavior in her paper Corporate
Misbehavior and Corporate Values. As is customary in
philosophical discourse, she gives precision to the concepts of
group beliefs and group values, to distinguish them from their
personal counterparts and to emphasize their strength
(through a group member's "commitment" to these beliefs and
values) in crowding out conflicting individual beliefs and
values. As she argues, "collective beliefs, values and goals are
apt to induce people to disguise their contrary opinions-
however morally perspicacious-and to abstain from any active
effort at their diffusion." She joins with Professors Trevifto and
Tyler in asserting that it is critical to prevent corporate
scandals for a firm to make moral values a part of its group
beliefs.
These articles clearly fulfill the goal of our conference of
promoting new avenues of scholarly research on business firms
and their pathologies. At the end of the conference, moreover,
its participants met in a planning session to discuss ways of
promoting research between organizational theorists and social
psychologists, on the one hand, and corporate scholars, on the
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other. This session led to the following projects: In the near
future, there will be launched an electronic journal to be
published by the Social Science Research Network entitled
"Business Associations and Financial Law: An
Interdisciplinary Journal," which is designed to circulate
papers in the business law area with a social science focus.
Participants in the conference as well as other interested
scholars are also working to create a model interdisciplinary
course with readings from the social sciences and the law. We
hope that these will be the first of many collaborative projects
between social scientists and legal scholars, and that the
projects may improve legal policy-making on the regulation of
corporations and financial institutions.
